After completing a tour through twenty American university faculties representing communication research (mainly departments of journalism, speech or sociology, institutes for communication research etc.) plus a number of private bases for American broadcasting and advertising research, a European observer is both impressed and upset. He is inspired because of the huge and evergrowing amount of manpower and money devoted to communication research in the USA, and he is stimulated by the impressive variety of different methods in studying the communication phenomena in the USA.
In short, my diagnosis of the patient is: 'Too much physical growth and too many toys to play with, too little intellectual growth and too few problems to think over'. Considering the total amount of research effort in the field of communications in the United States, it seems to me that simple thinking is poorly represented in relation to all kinds of sophisticated measurement. The field concentrates on being correct in the technical methods at the expense of being loose on the conceptual level: it is 'hyperscientific' and therefore quasiscientific. The field lacks theory: a solid conceptual framework exact and broad enough to relate the empirical data to the body of accumulating knowledge. The field also lacks ethical and ideological considerations: thinking about the norms and goals guiding mass communication activity and its research. I shall discuss each of these 'weaknesses' in order, with statements of some American authorities as starting points.
Tendency to 'hyperscience' Wilbur Schramm characterizes communication research as 'one of the great crossroads where many pass but few tarry'. Scholars come into it from their own disciplines, bringing valuable tools and insights, and later go back, like Lasswell, to the more central concerns of their disciplines. 4 This was obviously true at the time of the 'great founding-fathers', but no longer in the present situation, which is dominated by scholars originally and definitely identifying themselves with communication research. There are more 'communication approaches' today than there are 'psychology, sociology, political science etc. approaches to communication'. Most of these men of 'communication approach' work in the academic spheres of journalism, broadcasting or speech and usually publish their studies in Journalism Quarterly, Public Opinion Quarterly, Journal of Communication or Audio-Visual Communication Review. Some of them have started as practical professionals, others again have directly entered the schools of communication a professional career in their mind. In the beginning, their main orientation took the line of professionalism or liberal arts. However, the academic schooling with its emphasis on communication science reoriented them towards behavioral science. Men who earlier used to be expressive, literal and speculative gradually became critical, scientific and empirical. Professionals turned into 'communicologists'. I do not want to criticise these men for their scientific devotion; the reorientation from naive professionalism to sophisticated communicology was, of course, a necessary step towards the science of human communication. But I do have the naughty feeling that much of communicology has in practice been trivial factualization -a reorientation from naive professionalism to naive research. Much of this feeling has been elicited by the following statements of two Americans, Bernard Berelson who has already left the field of communication research (he works presently for Population Council, Inc.) and believes the field will die, and Malcolm S. MacLean Jr. who is still active (dean of the School of Journalism at the University of Iowa) and firmly believes in the future of the field. MacLean's opinion has been extracted from his paper presented at a convention of American journalism institutes:
I think that most of the research we have done has been done at too advanced a stage of precisionas though we presumed much more theory than we have…Recognizing a problem when you see one seems like the easiest of jobs. Yet, if we recognize a problem clearly, it means that our theory is quite advanced and so our problem is well on its way to solution. What we usually do recognize are some symptoms of things not going very well… Many of the problems we work with in communication research remain barely recognized and poorly defined. We researchers find that many practitioners cannot define their problems in terms that make sense to us. And when they do we are prone to dismiss them because they don't fit the research tools we like to use…
As it is now, we seem to act as though there were some magic about analysis of variance which can take the place of exploration, thinking and theory… 7 Interesting enough, as much as these two opinions seem to disagree -for instance one asking for less theory and the other asking for more theory -there is one common point in them: both are worried about the dominance of an esoteric and methodologically oriented communicology over a fresh and problem-oriented approach, i.e. tendency to 'hyperscience'. Berelson wants more propositions related to reallife; MacLean wants simply more thinking. In fact, I suspect that basically both of them want much of the same thing -they just might use different expressions and give different meanings to the word 'theory' (cf. below). My guess about the reasons for the development towards 'hyperscience' is that we have to look for them outside the camp of American communication researchers, from the general behavioristic tradition. 8 American communication research has grown up in an atmosphere of behaviorism and operationalism, which has made it correct in technical methodology but poor in conceptual productivity .The ultimate goal has been exactness of measurement rather than excellence of ideas. Very broadly speaking, it looks like most of the concepts with which communication research today operates were imported to the field by those 'passing visitors' whom Schramm speaks about and whom Berelson has no longer seen in the field; the original communication researchers are busy only technically testing and repeating their thoughts. 9 The field is full of technicians, but the engineers and idea-men are not numerous. Of course, this is not to say that 'technicians go away'; it is only a tentative comment on the overrepresentation of doing over thinking in research -very common to the orthodox behavioral approach. Obviously it was just the barren level of ideas to which Berelson paid his attention when he 'buried communication research'. And his point makes a good deal of sense, if only one overlooks the flourishing level of research operations. Naturally it is important to be exact and objective, but the communicologists may after all make too much fuss about proving their young field definitely 'scientific' by following the technical requirements of doing science when they at the same time forget about the conceptual and intellectual requirements -thinking about what they are doing and why. Those few -for instance Schramm -who still keep on devoting their main interest in more 'philosophical' communication research are easily laughed at by most 'scientific' communicologists for being 'speculators'. It should be remembered that the tendency to 'hyperscience' is by no means the monopoly of communication research, even if it is rather clearly to be noted there. Behaviorism and operationalism have introduced the same kind of sterility of ideas to almost all fields in the behavioral sciences. 'Liberation from subjective speculation' has lead to the 'objective American tradition', which happily rid itself of the 'philosophical European mysticism' but unfortunately -it was not logically necessary -at the same time was burdened by reluctance to think. The following anecdote expresses this dilemma quite nicely: American (behavioral) scientists know what they are speaking about but they are not interesting; European colleagues do not know what they are speaking about but they are interesting.
Lack of theoretical precision
A more or less common misconception about theory among 'hyperscientists' is that anyting that goes beyond the empirical or statistical evidence is 'subjective speculation' and not 'exact science'. This has lead to gathering of data without precisely defined meaning, which can be called 'hyperfactualization'
10 ; for instance, survey research with its quite invalid measurements very often represents this kind of ostensible 'scientific precision' or quasi-exactness. Exactness is not, after all, maintained by only correct technical research operations but rather by logically sound and differentiated conceptual analysis of the problem. A research project can hardly be better and more exact than its conceptual starting point has been. In this instance I verbatim agree with MacLean (see above). Berelson seems to have a different opinion with his criticism of 'premature theorizing'. However, I think Berelson would heartily agree with the necessity for a precise conceptual analysis of a problem before data collection. In a way, a thorough preliminary conceptual analysis is a good guarantee against esoteric and methodologically oriented 'hypertheorizing'. A careful and logically sound conceptual analysis is also a safeguard against McLuhan -type of wild speculation, which hides some inevitably clever points into an illogical conceptual mess. It is the conceptual looseness that makes theorizing premature rather than thinking itself. Theory in this sense of conceptual precision is by no means something opposite to professionalism and application. But it is true that theorizing as it is usually conducted in 'hyperscientific' communicology can too often with good reasons be criticised by professionalsand Berelson -for being irrelevant to reality. To sum up, it seems to me that the 'hyperscientific approach' resulting from extreme behavioral tradition explains both the tendency to fruitless empirism and esoteric theorizing -as opposite as these two 'weaknesses' at first sight appear to be. The key to the dilemma is an attentive -if needed also courageous -conceptual analysis of the problem, not guided by primarily methodological and 'hypertheoretical' considerations but by phenomena-directed propositions and their logical relationships. It is encouraging that a few researchers can already be noted who seem to have realized the urgent need for a brave but at the same time conceptually precise theory .
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One of the problem areas where promising development towards sound conceptual analysis and not trivial communicology can presently be found is research on information seeking. 12 On the other hand, there are plenty of problems which are continuously approached with an ill-defined conceptual framework but with a handy and respectable methodology which has begun to dominate so much that careful thinking on the phenomenon itself has been neglected; for instance, readability with Cloze procedure, and attitudes, images and meaning with the semantic differential or Q-methodology.There is nothing wrong with employing these methods themselves, but by using them to support a conceptually loose construction is to prostitute them. 13 The need for a unified theory in communication research is also expressed in a statement of 'one of the great four', Harold Lasswell, who said in a personal discussion:
The most obvious fact about communication research is that there has been very little integration of these investigations with a fundamental theory of the social process. The people who have been working on communication research have for the most part been interested in inventing techniques and improving particular techniques. They have been very much less interested in and competent in making the theoretical analysis of the role of communication in the social process. Consequently, there is no body of theory of what I call 'shaping and sharing of enlightenment' which is comparable with the theories about the 'shaping and sharing of wealth' which the economists have developed, or even the theories about the 'shaping and sharing of power' which a good many of the political scientists have been developing. Now then, my forecast is that this period of concern with the development of the procedures by which data can be gathered is likely to be followed by theorizing of more effective kind about the role of communication in all of the different institutional processes of society, developed and underdeveloped countries around the globe… One implication, too, I believe, is that there will be by far more systematic efforts made to pIan, to study the future. The pIan to investigate the emerging, the changes -not only the networks of communication, the messages of communication and the responses to communication and the characteristics of those who are engaged in the initiation and reception of messages -but there will
be far more comprehensive concern for setting up theories about probable courses of future development… I guess that there will be techniques of a more active and less passive kind. What I have in mind is that there will be more concern for anticipating the consequences of the interventions that are made in the future social process.
By this I mean forecasting the probable response of various audiences to various contents under various circumstances and relating the results as they emerge to the communication theory itself. This is the way that a usable theory will, I think, be developed. So that this anticipatory mode of thought will mean that unless one's theory is able to forecast who will respond how to how much change of the environment one doesn't yet have a theory.
14 The same prophecy of an increasing interest in theoretical questions in the field of communication research is shared by Schramm, who believes that we are quite close to a unified theory of communication. 15 There is really a good chance that the patient will soon begin to recover from the disease of 'hyperscience'.
Lack of ethical and ideological considerations
Both Lasswell and Berelson referred above to the responsibility of communication research to participate in solving social problems and in developing future communication systems. My argument is that this important responsibility has also been neglected among the 'hyperscientists' as a consequence of the tendency to keep away from 'speculation'. Too many communicologists have chosen the convenient role of an indifferent observator in relation to the ethics and ideology of communication; and this has been made for the sake of 'objectivity of science' in the hope of remaining absolutely neutral. In practice, however, this kind of attitude turns out to be very easily ideological quasi-neutrality: it is hardly possible for a scientist to simply withdraw from responsibility, because even saying nothing is an ideological position. 16 Communicology is really missing an active consideration of the values which are communicated. This position has been also taken by another 'one of the great four', Paul Lazarsfeld, who in his forecast asks for more studies about the working of television industry and about values of mass culture: 17 In the current research tradition, normative considerations have been too much masked by factual documentation; thinking about the goals of communication in various situations has been too often replaced by experimentation with different means of communication.
What is so badly needed is various kinds of studies of the industry
The conscious tendency is to avoid normative statements; anyhow, no justification is seen to change the present conditions -for instance, reducing violence from television programs 18 -if the omnipotent research results do not unanimously 'prove the change to be right'. Such behavior by a scientist who avoids ethical and ideological positions is nothing but good old conservatism. Counting on research results of 'neutral hyperscientists' is usually a safe guarantee against any change. As long as social scientists are ideologically naive it is possible to take advantage of them without their being conscious about it.
Concluding remarks
It is to be hoped that along with the rise of interest in theory of communication there will also be a growing intererest in philosophy of communication in the United States -not only among some specialists but among all communicologists and particularly 'hyperscientists'. Such a development would also inevitably reduce the well known and still very common antagonism between professoinal communicators (especially journalists) and communication researchers. It is possiblebecause of the vital importance of value problems to professional communicators -that much of the potential conflict between the 'pros and egg-heads' is contributed to the unpopularity of ethical and ideological interests among the 'hyperscientific' communicologists. It is also to be hoped that there will be a happy resolution to the same kind of conflict between professional approach and communicology approach within the area of joumalism education, which presently is more or less divided into two camps depending on the dominance of either one of the two approaches. 19 Each of these training traditions, when taken alone, seems to lead to a somewhat limited perspective: professionalism to competence in describing life to other people but not necessarily to insight in the very process of communication, and communicology to readiness to analyze the process of communication but not necessarily to insight in perceiving the flow of life. On the other hand, taken together these two approaches may lead to intellectually highly stimulating as well as professionally effective combination. 20 In fact, problems with the approaches of journalism education and problems with the approaches of communication research are essentially the same. Both in education and research it is important to be objective and scientific, but it may be fatal to exclude constant subjective and normative thinking from the curriculum. If it so happens, 'the baby may be thrown out with the bath' -the ideas may be lost while processing them. It has been my argument that there really is such a 'pathological' tendency in current American communication research -and consequently also in current European communication research, which is very much following the American patterns. If my diagnosis, as a European, is considered too condemning, it is only due to the fact that self-criticism easily produces more bitterness than criticism of others.
